By – Adv. Abhay Bansal
Introduction
The emergence of cyberspace and its borders have interfered with the conventional
frameworks of international law, which are in conflict, and perpetuates the legal
challenges by the sphere of state competition. The increased usage of cyber weapons by
the states to interfere inside the framework of others’ political institutions, vital
infrastructure, and democratic processes. Taking the example of the Russian meddling in
the 2016 US presidential election to ongoing hybrid warfare operations that combine
cyberattacks with disinformation efforts. 1 The international legal frameworks that are
made to govern these activities continue to become contentious and fragmented. This blog
examines how growing standards on state accountability and due diligence in cyberspace
are affecting international law’s response to cross-border cyber operations, election
manipulation, and hybrid warfare, as well as any significant gaps that still remain.
The Issue of Attribution and Governmental Obligation
The difficulty is in attributional issuance of highlighting the governmental ‘responsibility’
for carrying their cyber operations. In 2001, the Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) were approved by the International Law
Commission, in which state responsibility in international law is based on the attribution of
internationally wrongful conduct to the State. 2 However, Article 8 of ARSIWA, which
holds non-state actors accountable for their own actions when they follow the
“instructions” or “direction and control” of any state. This was developed during a time
when diplomatic ties and kinetic conflicts were very different from the anonymous, dispersed character of cyber operations. 3 The attribution test is still very strict. The
“overall control” threshold, as defined in Military and Paramilitary Activities and in
Nicaragua v. United States, necessitates sufficient proof that a state exerted effective
control over the behaviour rather than just assistance or encouragement. 4 This
development possessed serious challenges in the cyber environment. Hackers are often
sponsored by state who works frequently through non-state criminal networks, shell
corporations, and proxies, purposefully to hide funding flows and command lines. These
difficulties are best shown by the Russian election meddling case of 2016. Although US
intelligence tried to link GRU personnel to DNC email hacks, there was little direct
documentary proof of executive-level directives, which allowed Russian denials to
continue. 5 The most thorough explanation of how current international law relates with
the cyber activities to date may be found in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International
Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, which was written by a team of 19 experts in
international law and released in 2017. 6 The Manual lists 154 “black letter” regulations
and provides in-depth discussion on human rights, state accountability, sovereignty, and
specialised regimes. Crucially, the Tallinn Manual recognises that the “overall control”
threshold may need to be adjusted as state behaviour changes but maintains that ARSIWA
attribution rules apply to cyber operations without alteration. 7 According to a recent
research, Article 8 should be expanded to include “constructive knowledge”, a situation in
which a state knew or should have known that non-state actors were using its
infrastructure to launch operations from its territory, even in the absence of official
direction or control. 8 This would lessen the burden of proof and reflect the intentional
cultivation of plausible deniability in cyberspace. However, some states, oppose any
relaxation of attribution criteria, most notably its being advocated by China and Russia,
which makes this expansion still very controversial.
Election interference and violations of sovereignty
In the US election of 2016, Russian intervention sparked a contentious debate amongst
the international lawyers regarding which legal norms were violated. There is ample
evidence to support the facts that: “Russian military intelligence agents” has compromised
the opposition research, hacked the Democratic National Committee and the Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee, and disseminated it via middlemen like WikiLeaks. 9
Though scholars disagree with it, however, about only the specific legal infraction. Some
characterise it as a violation of the Charter’s non-intervention principle or customary
international law. 10 Others point to the Nicaragua case, which determined that
intervention includes actions that are unlawfully coercive in nature and target a state’s
preferred political, economic, or social structures. 11 The problem is that if people in the
target state are still free to disregard misinformation and cast their own ballots,
Information theft and disclosure related to cyber electoral involvement may not meet
traditional “coercion” requirements. Self-determination is emphasised in a more hopeful
approach. In situations when traditional sovereignty or intervention doctrine lacks
traction, Self-determination, an international legal principle that protects peoples’ freedom
to select their own political path without external intervention, is becoming more
popular. 12 Voters’ ability to make independent political decisions is compromised when a
foreign state uses cyber operations to influence the information environment they are
exposed to. This changes the definition of cyber election meddling from a limited
violation of sovereignty to a basic threat to democratic rights, requiring the host state to
exercise due diligence in order to stop actions that interfere with other people’s ability to
cast ballots. If the Russian state deliberately permitted or instructed GRU officers to carry
out the operations from Russian territory, then Russia’s interference in 2016 violated due
diligence. Even in the absence of actual infrastructure damage, the criteria for Tallinn
Rule 6’s “serious adverse consequences” imposes on duties for due diligence, which could
involve a decline in election integrity. Instead of using self-defence or countermeasures,
the US responded with diplomatic protests and later targeted sanctions, but an analysis of
international law indicates that the US could have done so more successfully.
Hybrid Conflict and Boundary Blurring
Hybrid warfare takes things up a different notch. We can say that it’s not just limited to
cyberattacks or fake news, but a mix of everything, which includes cyber hits,
disinformation, proxy fighters, economic threats, and diplomatic arm-twisting. These
campaigns are pre planned and they don’t just happen overnight. These plans took over
weeks or even months to play out, and a lot of what’s done might look legal if anyone
looks at each piece on its own. But when it is analysed all together, the goal gets pretty
clear: knock a country off balance, mess with its military, or shake up its economy. The
old international laws are not capable enough to handle this kind of high technological
advancement. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine in 2022 provided an illustration
of the development of hybrid conflict. Russian cyber activities targeted Ukraine’s
financial systems, government networks, and essential infrastructure prior to the invasion
in February 2022 which decreased their efficacy as Russia’s military forces advanced. 13
These exercises showed how cyberspace could serve as a force multiplier in a more
comprehensive coercion and conquering plan. They were coordinated with disinformation
efforts and traditional military operations.
In addressing hybrid operations, Tallinn Manual 2.0 emphasises that each component
activity must be assessed independently in accordance with applicable law.
Disinformation campaigns may break non-intervention norms if they are sufficiently
coercive; cyber operations that cause physical or functional harm may violate sovereignty
and trigger use-of-force restrictions; and proxy forces may deploy in accordance with
international humanitarian law (IHL) regulations on armed conflict. 14 However,
fragmentation is still a problem: a state engaging in hybrid warfare may contend that no
single element (such as an armed attack leading to self-defence reaches jus ad bellum
criteria, even while the whole effect is extremely destabilising. According to a theory of
cumulative attribution and responsibility, new research supports understanding hybrid
activities as cohesive wholes. 15 Even if individual elements of a state’s coordinated cyber,
informational, and kinetic operations do not violate the law on their own, the state’s
coordinated deployment of these operations would be evaluated for collective violations
of state accountability norms. This is still in its early stages, but it shows that practitioners
have realised that cyber has evolved from a discrete annoyance to a comprehensive tool of
statecraft, necessitating legal remedies that are proportionate to its systemic impacts.
Evolution of Norms and State Practices
Cyberspace norm-setting has been hastened by state practice in recent years. Estonia
released a policy paper in 2020 outlining how it interprets international law in cyberspace
and reiterating its commitment to due diligence in order to stop hostile cyber operations. 16
In a similar vein, Australia demanded that significant cyber incidents be reported and
committed to the due diligence standard. 17 Although they highlight the legitimacy of
information warfare and oppose broad interpretations of sovereignty violations, even
China and Russia, who are generally opposed to restrictive cyber standards, have
participated in GGE deliberations. The UN General Assembly has passed a number of
resolutions supporting the GGE-developed cyber norms, but there is less agreement as
Russia and China defend their sovereign rights to carry out information operations and the
US and its allies seek stronger language on election interference and disinformation. 18
Deeper geopolitical disagreements regarding the legitimacy of cyber operations as
instruments of state power are reflected in this fracturing, However, it also demonstrates
how official statements and actions are hardening norms, whether or not they are
contested. Experts’ groups and international law commissions continues to develop
norms. Since 2021, the Tallinn Manual 3.0 project has been underway process, which
promises updated standards reflecting state behaviour after 2017, including modifications
to attribution techniques and adjustments for hybrid operations. 19 Legally binding treaty
norms may eventually be created, as evidenced by the International Law Commission’s
interest in cyber activities as part of its broader agenda.
Conclusion and Suggestions
Traditional international legal categories are struggling to adapt to new operational modes
in cyberspace, which has become a domain of ongoing state competition. Accountability
in cyberspace really comes down to state responsibility and due diligence, ideas set out in
ARSIWA and the Tallinn Manual. International standards are still missing some modern
key pieces which shall needs to make clear rules on who’s to blame, how much exactly
counts can recognized in crossing the line, and how to actually enforce the law and not to
make it just a bold black letter. None of that’s settled yet. Now, the world faces a choice.
Do we set up real, binding rules to keep cyber conflict under control, or do we let things
spiral as countries keep hacking each other’s systems, mixing cyberattacks with old-
school warfare, and messing with elections? The push for stronger rules is there “new
standards on state accountability” and “due diligence” are in the works. But talking alone
on it won’t cut it. If governments don’t put in the legal and diplomatic effort to make
these rules stick, cyberspace could turn into a lawless arena where the strongest players do
whatever they want. And that’s a recipe for chaos, not security.
There has been progress made towards resolving issues regarding gaps in the absence of
definitions for serious adverse consequences from cyber operations, specifically for
determining which of these are serious enough to warrant the need for due diligence to
prevent an attack from happening. One question with no definitive answer is whether or
not cyber operations that disrupt an organisation’s provision of a service would rise to the
level of serious adverse consequence. Similarly, would a cyber operation that disrupts a
democratic election but does not damage the physical assets of that election also meet that
threshold for serious adverse consequence? The development of more explicit norms from
which serious adverse consequences are assessed will assist in defining what constitutes
necessary due diligence with respect to cyber operations, through international treaties or
the practice of states. Related to the aforementioned issues, there is also a need for states to develop international procedures for co-operation and attribution. Attribution
concerning to the private sector, which many states rely upon to demonstrate civil
liability, often lacks sufficient evidential integrity to establish a legal conclusion.
Establishing international organisations to conduct cyber forensic analysis along the lines
of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons would help provide states
with recourse for establishing accountability in respect to cyber-attacks. Finally, states
must also develop clarity around the relationship between self-defence (Article 51) and
due diligence in the context of cyber operations. For example, if a state suffered
destruction to critical infrastructure as the result of a significant cyber-attack, does it have
the right to respond pursuant to Article 51 with use of force? While most states have
exercised restraint in their responses to cyber operations to date, the Tallinn Manual
argues that any cyber operation that results in functional or physical harm could
potentially reach an operative level that triggers the right of self-defence. 20 We can cut
down on miscalculation risks by making online use-of-force rules easier to understand.
And honestly, it’s about time we had a solid cyber treaty. Sure, ARSIWA and the laws we
have now help a bit, but they don’t really fit the strange world of cyberspace. A real,
binding agreement spells out who’s responsible for what, lays down rules for tracing
attacks, bans things like targeting election systems, and puts real checks in place. People
can kick off this process through talks at the UN or even through groups like NATO.
1 US Department of Justice, Report on the Investigation into Russian Active Measures Regarding the 2016
Presidential Election (Washington DC, 2019) 1.
2 UN International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
(adopted 12 December 2001) UN Doc A/RES/56/83.
3 Michael N Schmitt (ed), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations
(Cambridge University Press 2017) 7–9.
4 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua v. United States of America (Merits) [1986]
ICJ Rep 14 [109].
5 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Background to “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions
in Recent US Elections”: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution (Washington DC, 2017) 1.
6 Schmitt (n 3) 1–5.
7 ibid., 41–52.
8 Marko Milanovic, ‘Attribution of Cyber Operations Under International Law’ (2017) 48(1) Colum J
Transnat’l L 775, 798–801.
9 Mueller (n 1) 1–50.
10 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, Oxford University Press
2012) 402–415.
11 Nicaragua (n 4) [205]–[210].
12 Tarcisio Gazzini, ‘Prevalence of Security Council Decisions over General Principles of International Law’
(2006) 35(1) Denv J Intl L & Pol 101, 122–125.
13 Scott, J.M. and Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Cyber Operations as “Use of Force” Under International Law:
Analytical Approaches and Challenges’ in Tilmann Altwicker and Julia Hals (eds), IAChr Meets Jus ad
Bellum (Oxford University Press 2020) 40–62.
14 Schmitt (n 3) 1–15.
15 Eviatar Bach and others, ‘Hybrid Threat Assessment: The Ukraine Conflict and Implications for NATO
Defence Strategy’ (2023) 22(3) J Strategic Stud 540, 556–570.
16 Estonia, National Cyber Security Strategy (Ministry of Social Affairs 2020) 4–5.
17 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia’s International Cyber Engagement
Strategy (Canberra, 2017) 12–14.
18 UN General Assembly, ‘Resolution on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications
in the Context of International Security’ (adopted 1 December 2022) UN Doc A/RES/77/31.
19 Schmitt, ‘Tallinn Manual 3.0 Project: Remaining Challenges and Opportunities’ (2022) 56(4) Colum J
Transnat’l L 812.


Leave a Reply